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Abstract in English 
This paper presents two scenarios for the future of manufacturing in Europe with varying trends 
in globalisation, technological progress and energy efficiency. From these scenarios, we 
conclude that the trend towards a services economy is likely to continue with employment 
shifting away from manufacturing towards services. However, manufacturing production still 
grows and is important for trade in Europe. The sectors which are already the most open ones 
for international trade are also the ones mostly affected by this trend. These include chemicals, 
rubber and plastics, the combined machinery and equipment sectors, textiles and wearing 
apparel, and wood and other manufacturing. R&D policies and internal market policies in 
Europe can have strong positive impact on manufacturing. These policies do not alter the trend 
that Europe’s share in global production and trade will continue to decline, but they do mitigate 
the overall decline, in particular in the chemicals, rubber and plastics, and combined machinery 
and equipment sectors. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Dit document presenteert twee scenario’s voor de toekomst van de industrie in Europa met 
verschillende trends voor globalisering, technologische vooruitgang en energie-efficiëntie. We 
concluderen dat de verschuiving naar een diensteneconomie zich waarschijnlijk voortzet met 
een bijbehorende verschuiving van de werkgelegenheid. De industriële productie blijft echter 
toenemen en blijft belangrijk voor de handel in Europa. De industriesectoren die het meest 
internationaal georiënteerd zijn, worden ook het meest beïnvloed. Dit zijn chemie, rubber en 
plastic, machines en apparaten, textiel en kleding en hout en overige industrie. R&D-beleid en 
interne-marktbeleid in Europa kunnen een significante positieve invloed op industriële 
productie hebben. Dit beleid verandert niet de trend van Europa’s dalende aandelen in de 
wereld productie en handel, maar zwakt deze daling wel af. Dit geldt in het bijzonder voor de 
chemie, rubber en plastic en machines en apparaten.  
 
Steekwoorden: scenario’s, industriesectoren, industriebeleid, Europa  
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Preface 
Manufacturing in Europe is affected by a changing world. Globalisation, EU integration, 
shifting demand and progress in science and technology, and innovation will all have a major 
impact on how the manufacturing landscape in Europe in terms of location, production, 
distribution of labour and physical appearance will manifest itself in the near and longer-term 
future. Change creates opportunities but also challenges. This is true for European citizens and 
European firms, but also for national governments and the European Union. 
 
This study investigates the future of manufacturing in Europe using a scenario approach. The 
purpose of this long-term scenario study is twofold: to provide policy makers, decision makers 
and others with two long-term scenario-based views on the future of European manufacturing, 
and to explore the scope for EU policies to affect this future positively. 
 
The development of these two scenarios has been requested by the European Commission and 
carried out within the Framework Service Contract B2/ENTR/05/091 – FC. The main results 
are summarized in the Competitiveness Report 2007 published by the European Commission 
(2007b), November 2007. This document provides more details of the study, in particular on the 
quantification of the scenarios. CPB and TNO collaborated in this study. Arjan Lejour and 
Gerard Verweij co- authored this paper. They benefited from comments by the commission, in 
particular by Emmanuelle Maincent and Ronald MacKay, who supervised the project, and Felix 




Director CPB   8   9 
Summary 
Is there a future for manufacturing in Europe and can framework policies help to improve this 
future? The glory time for manufacturing as steering engine for Europe’s economy and provider 
of employment for the majority of its labour force is over. The share of manufacturing in 
employment as well as in value added decreases in the OECD countries, including Europe, 
already for decades. However, three quarters of all trade is trade in goods, and its productivity 
still increases much faster than productivity in services. This document provides a  quantitative 
scenario study showing that the trend of a declining manufacturing sector is likely to continue 
over the next decades and that Asia will become the world’s most important provider of 
manufacturing goods. It also shows that framework policies can help to mitigate this decline, 
but not reverse it. This does not mean that there is no future for manufacturing in Europe. In 
2025 Europe’s share in the overall global manufacturing production and trade will still be about 
20%, and manufacturing will still contribute more than 15% to value added in Europe. A further 
strengthening of the internal market and adequate R&D and innovation policies can have a 
substantial impact on these shares; both are within reach of EU policy-making. We do not want 
to imply however that these policies have to be pursued. These facilitate growth in 
manufacturing but these policies are not necessary optimal to stimulate welfare or economic 
growth in Europe. 
 
The literature indicates that globalisation, technological progress, business models, ageing and 
the availability of energy and sustainability of the environment are among the main drivers for 
the future of manufacturing in Europe. The future trends of these drivers are uncertain. In order 
to assess Europe’s future in manufacturing two scenarios have been developed with varying 
quantitative trends in globalisation, technological progress and energy efficiency. From these 
scenarios, we conclude that the trend towards a services economy is likely to continue, with 
employment shifting away from manufacturing towards services and with manufacturing 
contributing less to the European economy in terms of employment and value added. However, 
manufacturing production still grows and is important for trade in Europe. In the Adventuring 
the World scenario in which globalisation and technological progress thrive, production grows 
quickly, but the geographical centre of global manufacturing production shifts to Asia. In the 
Cosy at Home scenario with less globalisation and technological progress, production grows 
more slowly and the European share in global production is relatively larger. 
 
A number of interesting conclusions on the future of manufacturing in Europe can be drawn. 
The increase in trade and, more generally, globalisation appears to be one of the most important 
drivers. The manufacturing sectors which are already most open for international trade are also 
the ones mostly affected by this trend. These include textiles and wearing apparel, wood and 
other manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and plastics, electronic equipment, transport equipment   10 
and other machinery and equipment. Overall, the sectors food products and pulp, paper and 
publishing are less affected. These are sectors which are more domestically oriented, less R&D 
intensive and face less technological progress. Europe has no comparative advantages in textiles 
and wearing apparel, electronic equipment and basic metals. These disadvantages will further 
manifest themselves in the oncoming twenty years. This in particular applies to electronic 
equipment which – while in the past a relative big sector - will decline even further. Textiles 
and wearing apparel is an already small sector in terms of value added and employment, which 
means that an even less prosperous future for this sector will also have less overall impact. 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics, transport equipment and other transport and equipment will 
remain important manufacturing sectors in Europe, although the comparative advantages in the 
other machinery and equipment sector will slide away. 
 
It has to be noted that the developments may also differ within the ten manufacturing sectors 
identified. In most of these aggregate sectors one can distinguish between basic and specialized 
manufacturing. Basic manufacturing will on average be more affected by international 
competitiveness than specialized manufacturing. Possible intra-sector shifts from basic to 
specialized manufacturing are not analysed here, but are certainly relevant. 
 
Of the framework policies analysed in this study, R&D and innovation policies and 
strengthening the internal market have the strongest and most positive impact on 
manufacturing. These are also the most ambitious in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation, but potentially very effective in supporting manufacturing because of their 
R&D intensive and open-to-trade nature. Improving skills, reducing the administrative burden 
and increasing energy efficiency have the least impact on manufacturing. The framework 
policies do not alter the trend that Europe’s share in global production and trade will continue to 
decline, but they do mitigate the overall decline, in particular in the chemicals, rubber and 
plastics, and combined machinery and equipment sectors. 
   11 
1  Introduction 
Manufacturing in Europe is affected by a changing world. Firstly, in 2004 ten countries joined 
the EU, in 2007 followed by Bulgaria and Rumania. Most of the new Member States have a 
different economic structure and other comparative advantages than the ‘old’ EU-15, in 
particular in labour-intensive industries. This is also the case for the candidate Member States in 
the Balkan countries and Turkey. Enlargement hence not only offers opportunities in terms of a 
larger domestic EU market, but also in terms of specialisation and - associated - economies of 
scale and scope.  
Secondly, there is the new wave of globalisation, which is unprecedented both in scale and 
in speed. This process of economic integration - with resources becoming more mobile, 
economies becoming increasingly interdependent and financial markets becoming increasingly 
international – has important implications for the future of manufacturing. This also holds for 
the integration of China and India in the world economy, home to about 35 percent of the world 
population. Both countries are leading and highly competitive exporters, India in software and 
IT-enabled services, and China in skill-intensive manufactures. Especially China has emerged 
as the new locomotive of the Asian region, and has in less than 20 years become the main 
world’s manufacturing and trade platform. Globalisation has also impacted European 
manufacturing in another way: lower production costs and the potential of huge new consumer 
markets have caused European manufacturers to increase the quality and design of their 
products and have led to international sourcing of (parts of their) production. 
Thirdly, consumer demand in Europe itself is changing. As its citizens are becoming richer, 
they demand more services and make more requirements on manufactured goods. 
Demographics (ageing) might strengthen this change. 
Finally, the pace of technological change appears to have sped up, in view of globalisation 
and increasing international competition. Globalisation, EU integration, shifting demand and 
progress in science and technology, and innovation – whether disruptive or not – will all have a 
major impact on how the manufacturing landscape in Europe in terms of location, production, 
distribution of labour and physical appearance will manifest itself in the near and longer-term 
future. Change creates opportunities but also challenges. This is true for European citizens and 
European firms, but also for national governments and the European Union. 
 
The future of manufacturing is assessed using two scenarios. The purpose of the scenarios is 
twofold: to provide policy makers, decision makers and others with two long-term scenario-
based views on the future of European manufacturing, and to explore the scope for EU policies 
to positively address and influence the future. The scenarios have been developed in three 
consecutive stages, consisting of (i) a survey of existing futures studies, (ii) the drafting of 
qualitative scenarios, and (iii) a quantification of the scenarios using WorldScan, a dynamic 
applied general equilibrium model for the world economy (Lejour et al., 2006).   12 
The survey of futures studies (Van der Zee and Brandes, 2007) served two goals: to help 
identifying the relevant main drivers and trends that from our current perspective and 
knowledge can be seen as key to the future of manufacturing in Europe, and to explore what 
other expert groups and think tanks regard as possible manufacturing futures. 
These drivers and trends have been translated in two scenarios and are extensively described 
in Brandes et al. (2007). In this study scenarios are conceived as feasible and consistent views 
of the future. They do not aim to predict the future, but rather to sketch alternative futures. 
These future states of the world then form the background against which strategic decisions can 
be explored. The uncertainty is reflected by sketching different developments in the 
fundamental drivers for the future of manufacturing in Europe. 
This document concentrates on the quantification of the scenarios and less on the qualitative 
scenarios. The scenarios are quantified for three main reasons. The first is that the model 
ensures that the scenarios are consistent in several respects, since economic variables conform 
to identities, constraints and the current knowledge about interactions in the economy. 
Secondly, the quantification gives a feel for the relative importance of various developments for 
the future well-being of society. Thirdly, the model offers also the possibility to assess the 
impact of framework policies and their relative importance. These two scenarios differ from the 
CPB scenarios in the Four Futures (FF) study (De Mooij and Tang, 2003). First, the scenarios 
developed here focus on manufacturing. Much more manufacturing sectors are distinguished 
and described than in the FF study. Second, the future trends are based upon the survey of Van 
der Zee and Brandes (2007). Third, the FF study develops four scenarios around two key 
uncertainties: the degree of international cooperation and the mix of public and private 
responsibilities. The two manufacturing scenarios do not take account of the  latter key 
uncertainty. Fourth, this study focuses on the enlarged EU of 27 Member States, while the FF 
study concentrates mainly on EU15. 
 
The contents of this study are as follows. Section 2 provides a numerical illustration of the 
macroeconomic developments in the scenarios using WorldScan. Section 3 analyses the impact 
of framework policies in support of manufacturing developments in Europe. Section 4 focuses 
on the developments in European manufacturing in the Cosy at Home scenario. Similarly, 
section 5 discusses the results of the Adventuring the World scenario. Section 6 concludes.   13 
2  Quantification of the scenarios 
This section provides a numerical illustration of the two scenarios until 2040, but with a focus 
on the period until 2025. It foremost illustrates scenario trends related to economic growth and 
economic integration which are at the heart of the WorldScan model (Lejour et al. , 2006). The 
two scenarios exemplify two explicit but ‘moderate extremes’. In Cosy at Home, inward-
looking, risk-averse, indecisive behaviour in the public as well as in the private realm dominate. 
In this scenario, technical progress is low, transport and communications costs do not decline, 
trade barriers remain in place and energy efficiency does not improve drastically. These 
elements are quantified below. In Adventuring the World outward-looking (resulting in a further 
opening-up), risk-loving and pro-active behaviour are prime. New technologies succeed each 
others quickly, trade barriers are slashed down and transport and communication possibilities 
improve. Moreover, energy use is becoming more and more efficient. Brandes et al. (2007) give 
a more extensive description of the qualitative scenarios. 
Worldscan 
WorldScan is a multi-sector, multi-region Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model. The model builds upon neoclassical 
theory,  and  solves  for  the  equilibrium  that  maximizes  welfare  across  the  entire  economy,  subject  to  technological 
constraints, greenhouse gas limitations, etc.). Producers maximise their profits and consumers maximise their utility. 
Production technologies relate output to inputs, so a potential increase in the output of a sector leads to extra demand 
for inputs. This links output to input markets. Moreover, trade flows between countries, and in particular two-way intra-
industry trade, are well modelled. The integration of national goods and services markets and of capital markets creates 
the possibility to analyse spillovers between countries. Another advantage is that these models distinguish several 
sectors in the economy. This model version inhibits endogenous R&D decisions and spillovers and  with imperfect 
competition. It distinguishes 15 regions and 20 sectors. Seven large EU countries are modelled separately, and two 
aggregates for the other old and new member states. Also United States, Japan, China, India South-East Asia and the 
rest of the world are distinguished. The sectors are agriculture, energy, ten manufacturing sectors and seven services 
sectors. The last sector is the R&D sector. 
 
This section presents the variation in exogenous inputs between the scenarios and the outcomes. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the scenario-specific trends. These trends determine the 
variation between the scenarios in two ways: directly, because the exogenous trends differ 
between the scenarios; and indirectly, because these differences imply also the variation in the 
model outcomes. Both scenarios have also common characteristics. These are presented in the 
appendix. 
The exogenous trends are subdivided into three categories: Labour productivity (includes 
unemployment), Global trade relations, and Capital (including savings) and Energy markets. 
Each category is discussed separately in one of the succeeding sections. 
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Table 2.1  Variation in exogenous inputs 
     
Trend  Cosy at Home  Adventuring the World 
     
Labour productivity EU  low  high 
Unemployment rate  constant over time  declining 
Global trade barriers  high  low 
Energy efficiency
  low  high 
Savings policy  no   yes 
Capital mobility  low  high 
     
Note that the terms low and high are used to describe the development of a trend in one scenario compared with the development in the 
other scenario. It is not meant to characterise differences between various trends in one scenario. 
 
2.1  Labour productivity 
Adventuring the World is the globalisation scenario represented by successful trade-
liberalisation rounds and increasing capital mobility. Economic growth is high in Adventuring 
the World because of more technology spillovers and a more rapid catching up of the 
developing countries (represented in higher TFP growth). Table 2.2 presents the annual average 
growth rates in labour productivity for the sub-periods 2006-2025 and 2025-2040. The growth 
in labour productivity is heavily based on the growth in TFP and the capital-labour ratio. 
Adventuring the World focuses on a smooth functioning of national and international goods and 
services markets. Innovation and fierce competition spur labour productivity all over the world. 
The twelve new EU members and  Asia catch-up fast with the EU-15 and the rest of the OECD. 
The growth in labour productivity in the Rest of the World is much lower than in these 
catching-up regions. 
Table 2.2  Labour productivity growth, annual averages 2006-2040 by region 
     
                      Cosy at Home                      Adventuring the World 
         
  2006-2025  2025-2040  2006-2025  2025-2040 
         
EU27  1.5  1.2  2.5  2.7 
EU-15  1.3  1.0  2.4  2.5 
EU-12   3.1  2.2  4.7  3.8 
Rest OECD  1.3  0.9  2.0  2.0 
Asia  3.3  2.8  4.6  4.2 
Rest of the World  1.9  1.8  2.9  2.8 
 
Source: WorldScan. 
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In Cosy at Home, labour productivity growth is lower than in Adventuring the World: the 
difference is about 1 %. No important innovations spur economic growth. This is the case for  
all regions.  
Table 2.2 shows that the spread for the EU-27 between labour productivity growth rates is 
1.5%-point. As we see below, that explains a large part of the variation in GDP growth. From 
the table, it also follows for the EU-27 that labour productivity growth differs in Cosy at Home 
about 0.3%-points and in Adventuring the World 0.2%-points between the period 2006-2025 
and the period 2025-2040. However, sectoral TFP growth is constant over time.
1 Two 
mechanisms explain this apparent contradiction. First, the economy shifts from manufacturing 
towards services. Macro labour productivity growth is the aggregate of sectoral growth, and 
service sectors inhibit productivity growth less than the former sectors. Second, the growth of 
the capital-labour ratio also affects labour productivity growth. 
Table 2.2 also reveals the pattern of catching up. Labour productivity growth in poorer 
regions, i.e. the EU-12 members and the non-OECD, exceeds that in the EU-15, the United 
States and Japan. This process will, in time, narrow the gap in GDP per capita between regions. 
The developments in labour productivity and employment growth determine GDP growth. 
Table 2.3  GDP growth, annual averages 2006-2040 by region 
     
                       Cosy at Home                       Adventuring the World 
         
  2006-2025  2025-2040  2006-2025  2025-2040 
         
EU27  1.3  0.7  2.5  2.3 
EU-15  1.2  0.7  2.4  2.3 
EU-12   2.6  0.9  4.4  2.6 
Rest OECD  1.5  1.2  2.3  2.3 
Asia  4.6  3.3  6.1         4.8 
Rest of the World         3.3         2.5         4.5         3.6 




The pattern of GDP growth in Table 2.3 is similar to that of labour productivity growth. 
Therefore, 0.1% between 2006 and 2025, which results in a slightly lower GDP growth 
compared with labour productivity growth. Between 2025 and 2040, this effect becomes 
stronger for the EU-15: employment declines with about 0.2% to 0.3% resulting in a lower 
GDP growth compared with labour productivity growth. The decline in employment for the 
EU-15 consists of a declining population growth and participation rate. For the new EU-27 
members, the differences between GDP growth and labour productivity growth are more 
pronounced. Between 2006 and 2025 employment declines with 0.3% or 0.5% and between 
2025 and 2040 with 1.2% or 1.3%. The large differences between 2006-2025 and 2025-2040 
 
1 Except for the transition path between current TFP growth in 2006 and scenario specific TFP growth 2010.   16 
are mainly due to a fall in participation rate over time. Therefore, GDP growth is relatively low 
in comparison with the labour productivity growth for the new EU-27 members. 
2.2  A redirection of trade 
In Adventuring the World, global trade-liberalisation is successful and leads to a reduction in 
tariffs and NTBs between 2006-2015 (Doha round) and 2021-2030 (post-Doha round). The 
Doha round leads worldwide to a reduction of tariffs in manufacturing and services with 50% 
and in agriculture, food and raw materials with 25%. Also the NTBs are reduced with 25%. The 
post-Doha round encompasses a further reduction of tariffs in the manufacturing and services 
sectors with 50% and in agriculture, food and raw materials with 25%. Again, the NTBs are 
reduced with 25%. In Cosy at Home, global trade liberalisation fails. 
In Adventuring the World, we furthermore assume that the costs of international trade are 
gradually reduced with 80%. This will facilitate international trade. In Cosy at Home, the 
situation is quite different; for the EU-15 members the costs of international trade are reduced 
with only 50%, while outside the EU-15 international trade costs are even increased with 50%. 
The variation in regional and global trade policies leads to a diverse picture of openness in 
the scenarios. Table 2.4 presents the openness of the EU-27 and the other regions. Openness is 
measured as the average value of imports and exports divided by national income. It also 
includes intra EU-27 trade, which is an important share of total trade, as we will see below. In 
the Cosy at Home scenario openness is about constant over time for the EU-15 and the rest 
OECD, but decreases with 5 to 10% for the other regions. The shift to services in the latter 
regions which are less open for cross border trade is the main reason for the overall drop in 
openness. This is completely different in Adventuring the World, which features liberalised 
global trade. Not only are tariffs and non-tariff barriers lowered or even eliminated, but also 
trade is facilitated by more transparent and uniform customs procedures. The degree of 
openness increases by about 10%-points and for Asia by even 25%-points compared to Cosy at 
Home. 
Table 2.4  Openness of the various regions in 2040 
       
  2005  Cosy at Home  Adventuring the World 
       
EU-27  34.1  33.3  39.3 
EU-15  32.2  31.7  37.1 
EU-12  63.5  51.0  62.8 
Rest OECD  10.4  11.5  19.4 
Asia  30.3  22.8  47.3 
Rest of the World  22.8  17.7  31.9 
 
Source: WorldScan; all aggregates include intra trade 
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Changes in the openness of regions and differences in regional growth patterns affect also the 
size and direction of trade flows. The direction of trade changes drastically in both scenarios as 
shown in Figure 2.1. 







2005 Cosy at Home Adventuring in the World
EU-27 rest OECD South East Asia rest of the World  
Asia will become a more important trading partner for Europe during the coming decades in 
Cosy at Home and Adventuring the World, in particular. This is triggered by high economic 
growth in Asia. This redirection of trade goes at the expense of the internal EU-27 trade share. 
Also the Rest of the World, as Figure 2.1 shows, becomes a more important trading partner for 
the EU-27, although less pronounced as South East Asia. In general, the redirection of trade is 
stronger in Adventuring the World, with its high GDP per capita growth and trade liberalisation, 
than in Cosy at Home. 
2.3  Capital and energy markets 
In the globalisation scenario Adventuring the World, we assume that capital market integration 
will increase. In this scenario, it will become easier for the EU-27 to attract capital from abroad 
in order to finance investment, given the decreasing macro saving rates due to ageing. 
Moreover, we assume that governments in the EU-27, and also in the US and Japan, are active 
in increasing savings by eliminating budget deficits and by stimulating private savings. This is 
reflected by higher macro savings rates of about 2%-points in 2020 and 2040.  
    18 





























Cosy at Home Adventuring in the World  
Governments do not follow these policies in Cosy at Home, and saving rates are subsequently 
lower. Besides that, in the fragmented world of Cosy at Home, capital mobility is even reduced. 
Irrespective of these differences, Figure 2.2 shows that saving rates in the EU decline in both 
scenarios because of the aging population (see Lejour et al., 2006).  
 
Savings depend on GDP per capita growth, demographic characteristics and savings policies. 
Higher GDP growth stimulates savings, while ageing hinders it. As a result, savings are highest 
in Adventuring the World and lowest in Cosy at Home (as confirmed in Table 2.5). Even in 
Adventuring the World, national savings in the EU-27 decline (as a share of national income) by 
3%-points. The effect of ageing on savings dominates the effects of higher GDP growth and a 
savings policy. In South East Asia, savings decline by about 6%-points. The savings in the rest 
OECD also decline, but somewhat less than in the EU. 
Table 2.5  National savings (as ratio of national income) 
  Past      Cosy at Home                       Adventuring in the World 
           
  2005  2025  2040  2025  2040 
           
EU-27  20.5  18.2  15.0  20.9  17.9 
   EU-15  20.3  18.2  15.2  21.2  18.3 
   EU-12  23.3  17.7  12.3  18.2  12.8 
Rest OECD  19.8  16.5  15.7  18.7  18.0 
South East Asia  30.2  29.7  24.3  30.0  24.6 
Non-OECD  20.7  21.1  19.1  21.3  19.4 
 
Source: WorldScan 
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The international capital markets play only a minor role in determining the sectoral production 
structure, because the capital inputs are distributed quite homogenous across sectors. Despite 
this homogeneity, some spread in capital shares exists across sectors. As can be seen in the 
appendix, table a.3, relatively high physical capital shares in value added are found for the 
sectors energy carriers (62%), food products (53%) and other business services (51%).  
However, savings do not only flow to the international markets for physical capital: they are 
also used nationally to finance R&D investments. After adding up physical and R&D capital 
inputs, the sectors electronic equipment (45%), transport equipment (40%) and chemicals 
(45%) also reveal substantial capital input shares.  
 Besides the supply of capital, also the demand for capital determines the behaviour of the 
capital markets. The demand for capital will largely depend on the growth in GDP; more GDP 
growth corresponds to a larger demand for capital. We will not expand further on these issues, 
because the capital markets are not the main drivers in the scenarios. 
 
The Adventuring the World scenario is characterised by relatively fast technological growth. 
This process also shows up in the energy-specific technology, which improves with 1.5% per 
annum. An increase in energy efficiency will result in a reduced demand for the energy carriers 
in the production process. However, the rise in energy efficiency also makes the production 
price decline, especially in the energy intensive sectors. As a consequence, the demand for 
energy intensive products will rise, as will the demand for energy inputs. These two opposing 
effects will lead to a net decline in energy demand.  
In the Cosy at Home scenario, less technological growth is assumed. Therefore, the 
improvements in energy-specific technology are assumed to be only 0.5% per annum, which is 
modest in comparison with the 1.5% in the Adventuring the World scenario. Consequently, the 
shifts in sectoral production as described above for the Adventuring the World scenario are less 
pronounced. 
The results for energy efficiency improvements should be analysed with some caution, 
because the WorldScan version we have used to analyse the scenarios does not attach any costs 
to the development and implementation of these energy technologies.   20   21 
3  Framework policies and the macro impact on 
manufacturing 
The question is whether the trends in manufacturing could be affected by policies. We do not 
explicitly think of targeting and subsidizing specific industries but concentrate on frame work 
policies which could affect the environment in which industrial production takes place in 
Europe. For both scenarios we will analyse the impact of fostering good framework policies, 
supporting the development of manufacturing in Europe (see sections 4 and 5). This section  
presents the macroeconomic impact of conducting these policy packages and describes the 
imputed framework policies. 
 
According to EC (2005) framework policies could include upgrading skills, better regulation 
and less administrative burdens for firms, R&D and innovation policies, A strong competitive 
Single Market, including competition, environmental policies, supporting energy policies and 
global trade policy. Although most of these policies will affect the manufacturing sectors in 
general, the outcomes will be sector specific. For energy-intensive sectors, energy policy has 
much more impact than on energy extensive sectors. This will also be the case for developments 
of skills or R&D. There are two caveats here. First, global trade policy is already one of the 
elements in Adventuring the World because the degree of globalisation was identified as one of 
the most important driving forces for the future of manufacturing. It is not possible to consider 
this policy in the policy package because trade is already much liberalised in Adventuring the 
World. The second caveat is that this version of the model focuses on sectoral detail in 
manufacturing and not on energy sectors. It is not possible to model the development of 
alternative energy carriers, emission trading, or more competition in specific energy sectors. We 
model energy efficiency in production and more integration of the aggregated energy sector is 
part of a stronger internal market.  
3.1  Overall effects of framework policies 
Table 3.1 presents the macro outcomes on GDP , the volume of consumption and exports for 
the EU as a whole in 2025 for both scenarios. The effects on the manufacturing sectors are 
discussed in sections 4 and 5. All results are presented as relative changes compared to the 
respective baseline in 2025. From the results, it appears that GDP could increase by 8% in the 
EU, consumption by about 9% and exports by 40%. The differences between the two scenarios 
are minor. In Adventuring the World the GDP increase is slightly larger than in Cosy at Home, 
mainly because of the large impact of R&D and Internal market policies. The increase in 
exports is higher in Cosy at Home. This is a composition effect because a higher share of total 
exports is destined to other European countries in Cosy at Home. An increase in intra-EU 
exports due to new single market policies has thus a larger effect on total exports. R&D and   22 
innovation policies have the largest impacts. These ambitious policies are responsible for about 
40% of the total GDP effect. The reduction in administrative burden adds about 1.5% to GDP 
and internal market policies about 2%. Skills contribute less, but in time if the whole labour 
force has been educated the effects will be larger, see Gelauff and Lejour (2006). The 
(ambitious) internal market policies have a substantial effect on trade. The export numbers 
reflects total EU exports. Intra EU trade effects will be about twice as large.  
















                                                           Cosy at Home 
             
GDP  0.5  3.0  1.5  1.7  0.9  7.7 
Consumption  0.5  1.6  1.4  5.5  0.9  9.8 
Exports  0.5  4.8  1.4  40.6  1.8  49.0 
 
                                                           Adventuring the World 
             
GDP  0.6  3.5  1.6  2.3  0.8  8.8 
Consumption  0.5  1.6  1.4  5.2  0.8  9.4 
Exports  0.6  5.9  1.6  29.0  1.5  38.5 
 
Source: WorldScan simulations. The results are % changes from the baseline in 2025.  
 
The remaining sub-sections describe these five framework policies in more detail. 
3.2  Skills 
As part of the Lisbon process, the Barcelona summit of 2002 endorsed common objectives for 
education and training in Europe. The May 2003 Council agreed on five targets (European 
Commission, 2004b) by 2010: 
 
·  An EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers should be achieved.
2 
·  At least 85% of 22 year olds in the European Union should have completed upper secondary 
education or higher. 
·  The percentage of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading literacy in the European Union should 
have decreased by at least 20% compared to the year 2000.  
·  The European Union average level of participation in Lifelong Learning should be at least 
12.5% of the adult working age population (25-64 age group). 
·  The total number of graduates in mathematics, science and technology (MS&T) in the European 
Union should increase by at least 15% by 2010 while at the same time the level of gender 
imbalance should decrease. 
 
2 It was not possible to implement this target separately in the analysis, see Gelauff and Lejour (2006).    23 
To compute the impact of reaching the targets on education and training, Jacobs (2005) 
developed a small, independent ‘satellite model’ to WorldScan, which incorporates various 
aspects of skill-formation needed to simulate the targets. The satellite model also contains a 
stylised cohort model to compute the impact of reaching the targets in 2010 on the skill 
structure of the labour force in the period 2010-2040. The cohort model takes into account that 
it takes many years before the skill structure of the labour force has adjusted to the higher 
educated cohorts that leave formal education. The satellite model calculates a time path of the 
increase of labour efficiency that originates from Europe reaching the skill targets in 2010. This 
increase in labour efficiency is subsequently inserted in the WorldScan model, which computes 
the general equilibrium effects of the education and training policies. 
From the analysis in Gelauff and Lejour (2006), we know that it takes a long time before the 
benefits of the efforts for improving skills can be reaped. The macroeconomic gains will be 
substantially higher in 2040 than in 2025 because in the latter year a large part of the labour 
force has been educated in a period before the Lisbon reforms were introduced. Therefore, it is 
important to formulate new skill policies in time and not to wait until the full benefits of these 
policies are realized. Although it is difficult to attain the targets formulated above in 2010, these 
target are not very ambitious. In order to guarantee sufficient supply of skilled workers for 
manufacturing, it seems prudent to formulate more ambitious policies for the decades after 
2010. 
Because the WorldScan model does not distinguish MS&T workers we are not able to 
evaluate the effect of policies to stimulate the supply of these workers, but this does not imply 
that increasing the number of MS&T workers is not important for manufacturing in Europe. 
3.3  Less red tape in Europe 
Firms often complain about the time and costs involved to deal with administrative activities. 
To implement the reduction of administrative cost in WorldScan, we assume that these costs 
largely consist of wages for workers that firms need to hire to comply with government 
regulations and to provide the government with information. Reducing the administrative 
burden implies that some of these workers can contribute directly to production. The reduction 
therefore takes the form of an increase in labour efficiency: fewer workers are needed, while 
production is not affected directly. Furthermore, we assume that the cost reduction is achieved 
by making the administrative process more efficient; it does not undermine government 
regulations. 
The Netherlands is one of the very few countries which currently has detailed information 
on the administrative burden of government regulations. For 2002, the administrative burden in 
the Netherlands is equivalent to 3.7% of GDP (of which about 40% is due to EU regulation) and 
is projected to fall with 25%, e.g. with 0.9% of GDP. Therefore, we use the key figures for the 
Netherlands as a benchmark for the other member states of the European Union. To arrive at a   24 
meaningful international comparison, Kox (2005) combined the Dutch data on the total 
administrative burden with the Djankov et al. (2002) data on inter-country differences in firm-
start-up costs to obtain estimates of the administrative burden per country. 
This study does not assess the effectiveness of reducing red tape by 25%. A part of the 
administrative burden could be overdone and therefore reduced without any harmful effects, but 
another part of the administrative burden is inevitable and necessary. A part of the regulation 
has to aim to check for example the quality of products and services or to protect the well being 
of employees. These issues are not addressed within the policy package. It seems clear that the 
administrative burden for firm could be reduced because the whole burden is a stack of non-
integrated regulations which seems to cumulate over time. For a careful analysis, more detailed 
information on the administrative burden is necessary. In recent years, some initiatives came up 
to improve the monitoring and registration of the administrative burden. This detailed 
information could be useful to assess the necessity of reducing the administrative burden. 
3.4  Research and Development  
Research and Development (R&D) is a key factor for technological change, and consequently 
economic growth. New technologies can boost productivity and raise incomes. The European 
Council agreed to raise these R&D expenditures from 1.9% in 2004 to 2.7% of GDP in 2010. In 
the WorldScan simulations, we assume that the targets are reached in 2010 9iwth some 
exceptions). We do not claim that this assumption is realistic. In particular in the new member 
states, current R&D expenditures are less than 1% percent. It is very difficult to increase these 
expenditures substantially within a few years and to attract or train sufficient researchers in such 
a relatively short period of time. Although a fruitful R&D climate in Europe can be a 
comparative advantage for manufacturing, it is questionable whether a further increase in R&D 
spending on top of the Lisbon target is effective. Ample availability of knowledge workers, and 
clustering of innovation activities to increase interaction and a good diffusion of new ideas and 
technologies could be more important. 
We take account of some of the policy costs of achieving the R&D target by using a national 
R&D subsidy to reduce the investment price for R&D. This probably underestimates the costs 
for two reasons. First, we assume that the subsidy is spent effectively leading to more R&D 
expenditure. The literature suggests this is not the case, a part of the subsidies carry a 
deadweight loss. Second, the subsidy is paid by a lump-sum transfer from the domestic 
households. In practice, most taxes are proportional such as the income tax, so we abstract from 
the excess-burden of proportional taxes. 
R&D also generates international spillovers: R&D in one country has an external effect on 
productivity in the country itself as well as for its trading partners. WorldScan distinguishes 
domestic spillovers from other sectors in the economy, and of foreign sectors to reflect 
international spillovers.   25 
3.5  A stronger Single market 
EC (2006) proposes to integrate services markets in Europe. Until now, cross border trade and 
FDI remains limited due to the level of and differences in regulation in services between 
member states. Also with respect to goods markets, Europe can integrate further. The principle 
of mutual recognition does not work satisfactory and EC (2007a) proposes to improve the 
functioning of this principle. Moreover, in public procurement, only a tiny fraction is awarded 
by foreign firms (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007). This suggest that goods and services markets can be 
integrated further. The European Commission aims also to integrate energy markets further. We 
increase trade in services, energy and manufacturing by reducing NTB in cross border trade 
between the member states, see also Gelauff and Lejour (2006) on opening up services markets. 
We lower the NTBs is intra-EU services and energy trade by 20% points and in goods and 
agriculture by 10% points. The 20% reduction in NTBs for services trade is in the range 
suggested by De Bruijn et al. (2008) to analyse the impact of the Services directive. Kox and 
Lejour (2006) argue that the implementation of the Services directive will not remove all 
barriers in services trade within the EU. Also Dekker et al. (2007) argue that the internal market 
is for from complete and further integration could enhance welfare in the EU. 
3.6  Environmental policy 
We assume that Europe promotes energy efficiency in order to slow down the depletion of 
fossil fuels and to cut carbon emissions. By promoting R&D in clear technologies, public 
campaigns to change conduct and regulation, firms produce more environmental friendly and 
fossil fuels are saved. The reduced necessity for fossil fuels reduces production costs and 
stimulates production, in particular for energy-intensive firms. We increase energy efficiency in 
production in all sectors (except the energy sector itself) by 1% per year. However, we are not 
able to incorporate the costs of developing more energy efficient technologies. Moreover, we 
want to remind that the analytical framework to assess the future of manufacturing in Europe 
does not inhibit sufficient details to model carefully energy and environmental policies such as 
stimulating renewables, biomass and biofuels, environmental taxes and emission trading 
schemes. By definition, environmental policy is very rudimentary modelled here.   26   27 
4  Manufacturing in Cosy at Home 
This section presents the future of European manufacturing in the Cosy at Home scenario. First 
we consider the manufacturing sector in a broad perspective. We present developments in value 
added and shares in global production and trade. We also discuss the impact of the framework 
policies. After the broad picture of European manufacturing is sketched in section 4.1, section 
4.2 concentrates on particular manufacturing sectors characterised by various levels of 
technology and R&D intensity and labour skill intensity. For these sectors, we also assess the 
impact of framework policies. The developments in Adventuring the World are presented in 
section 5. 
4.1  Manufacturing in a broad perspective 
Consumer demand for services will increase relatively to the demand for commodities. This 
drives the trend towards a services economy. The share of manufacturing in Europe decreases 
from 22.9% to 20.1% of value added between 2005 and 2025 and the share of services increases 
from 72.2% to 74.6%. The share of primary industry including energy remains more or less the 
same. In comparison with the twentieth century, the speed of structural changes seems to slow 
down. 
Manufacturing production shifts from the traditional developed regions to Asia from 21.2 to 
33.2 % of global production as is shown in Figure 4.1. In 2025, Asia will produce the largest 
share of manufacturing goods. Europe’s share decreases from 26.6% to 19.7% and the share of 
the Rest of the OECD decrease by about 8% points. The change for the rest of the world is 
modest. If the EU puts its framework policies in place, Europe produces still 22.5% of all 
manufacturing in 2025. This is 2.8% points higher than without framework policies. Although a 
smaller share of all manufacturing production will take place in Europe within two decades, this 
decline is smaller with supporting framework policies. 
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For trade shares, we see a similar pattern. Europe’s share in global manufacturing trade 
decreases from 22.7% to 17.3% in 2025.
3  Also for the rest of the OECD countries, the global 
trade share decrease substantially. China, India and the South-East Asia increase their market 
share from 26.7% to 34.8% as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The implementation of framework 
policies mitigate Europe’s decline in manufacturing trade shares. In 2025, the global trade share 
is still 19.2% which is about 2% point higher than without framework policies. Interestingly, 
the trade and production share of the rest of the world remain more or less constant. It is solely 
the rise of Asia which reduces Europe’s market shares. 
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4.2  Manufacturing in a detailed perspective 
Labour productivity growth hides some important differences between sectors. In particular, 
some sectors will experience faster growth than others, while the relative performance of 
sectors differs across the scenarios. Table 4.1 presents growth in production volumes by sector 
and the impact of the framework policies. The production increases are fuelled by the 
assumptions on TFP growth (see appendix). TFP growth is high in agriculture, transport 
services and communication and production growth is also relatively high in these sectors. On 
average, TFP growth is higher in manufacturing than in the services sectors, but the effects on 
sectoral production growth are less clear. Here the degree of international competition in 
manufacturing comes in as determining factor. In electronic equipment, production does not 
even increase the next two decades and in basic metals and other machinery and equipment 
production growth is significantly below average. Also in textiles and wearing apparel, 
production growth is relatively low. 
Although the framework policies are not sector specific, these policies have a large effect on 
manufacturing sectors. In particular for electronic equipment, production growth is now 2% 
higher per annum. In sectors like transport equipment, other machinery and equipment, 
chemicals, rubber and plastics, and textiles it is about 1% per year. 
 
3 Note that intra-EU trade is excluded from these figures.   29 
Table 4.1  EU production growth by sector for Cosy at Home (annual growth in % for 2005-2025) 
     
Sector  No framework policies  Framework policies 
     
Agriculture, oil and minerals  1.8   1.8  
Energy carriers  2.0   2.1  
Food products  1.3   1.4  
Textiles and wearing apparel  1.0   1.8  
Wood and other manufacturing  1.6   2.1  
Pulp, paper and publishing  1.2   1.4  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  1.3   2.2  
Non-metallic minerals  1.1   1.4  
Basic metals  0.8   1.4  
Electronic equipment  - 0.1   2.1  
Transport equipment  1.2   2.4  
Other machinery and equipment  0.5   1.3  
Research and development  0.1   2.6  
Transport services  1.9   2.2  
Construction  0.9   1.3  
Trade services  1.1   1.3  
Communication  1.7   1.7  
Financial services  1.2   1.2  
Other business services  1.2   1.3  
Other services  1.2   1.4  
     
Source: WorldScan     
 
The strengthening of the internal market has a substantial effect on trade in manufacturing 
sectors like textiles, and the combined machinery and equipment sectors as is presented in 
Table 4.2. These sectors are together with chemicals and wood products the most open for 
trade. The increase in manufacturing production draws resources from the services sectors. As a 
result services production declines in spite of the increased trade opportunities in services. 
Trade in services is more stimulated than trade in goods within this policy. Due to the openness 
of manufacturing sectors, it has much more effect on production in these sectors. This does not 
imply that opening up services markets is of no use. If services trade within the EU was not 
stimulated by this policy the adverse affects of stimulating good trade on services output would 
be bigger. 
 
The increase in R&D benefits the most R&D intensive industries, like electronic and transport 
equipment, other machinery and equipment and chemicals. Also non-metallic minerals and 
basic metals benefit more than the R&D-extensive service sectors. R&D does not only affect 
the sectors directly but also indirectly by the spillovers between domestic sectors and the 
international spillovers. 
 
More energy efficiency seems to increase production in most sectors. In particular the energy-
intensive sectors, like the chemical industry and transport services, benefit. For the energy   30 
sector itself it has a negative impact due to reduced energy demand. Non-metallic minerals 
benefits because it is energy-intensive, a manufacturing sectors like transport equipment benefit 
because equipment is more demanded by the increase in transport services. 
Table 4.2  Production volume changes per sector due to framework policies in 2025, Cosy at Home 














             
Agriculture, oil and minerals  0.3  0.7  1.0  - 2.3  0.3  0.0 
Energy carriers  0.3  2.1  1.2  2.2  - 3.3  2.4 
Food products  0.2  1.2  0.9  0.2  0.7  3.1 
Textiles and wearing apparel  0.6  0.7  1.9  13.1  0.9  17.3 
Wood and other manufacturing  0.5  1.7  1.7  5.3  1.5  10.8 
Pulp, paper and publishing  0.5  1.9  1.4  - 1.1  0.9  3.5 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  0.5  9.1  1.6  4.4  3.2  18.9 
Non-metallic minerals  0.4  3.7  1.4  - 0.9  1.2  5.9 
Basic metals  0.6  5.1  1.9  3.7  - 0.2  11.1 
Electronic equipment  0.7  24.6  2.4  24.9  0.6  53.2 
Transport equipment  0.6  11.6  1.8  9.8  1.2  25.0 
Other machinery and equipment  0.7  6.1  2.0  9.9  0.0  18.8 
Research and development  1.1  54.9  2.2  5.2  0.2  63.6 
Transport services  0.4  0.8  1.2  0.5  4.2  7.2 
Construction  0.4  2.3  1.4  2.9  0.7  7.7 
Trade services  0.4  1.3  1.2  0.1  0.5  3.5 
Communication  0.5  0.7  1.3  - 1.1  0.1  1.5 
Financial services  0.5  0.3  1.3  - 1.9  0.1  0.3 
Other business services  0.4  1.1  1.3  - 0.8  0.3  2.3 
Other services  0.5  0.7  1.4  1.5  0.4  4.4 
 
Source: WorldScan. The numbers represents relative changes in production compared to the baseline (=scenario without framework 
policies) in 2025. The totals are the aggregates of the five separate policies and are also reflected by the differences in annual production 
growth in Table 6.1. 
 
From Figure 4.1, we know that Europe’s share in global manufacturing declines by about 7% 
points. Table 4.3 shows that this decline is larger in electronic equipment and other machinery 
and equipment. For food products and wood and other manufacturing and pulp, paper and 
publishing it is much lower. Also in services, Europe’s share in production decreases, although 
on average the changes are smaller reflecting a shift towards services in production in Europe. 
Framework policies such as formulated in section 4, counteract this decline. In particular in 
electronic equipment, the effects are staggering. The sector benefits extremely from subsidising 
R&D activities and the strengthening of the internal market.
4 Also in transport equipment, 
chemicals, rubber and plastics and textiles and wearing apparel, Europe increases its share in 
global production by more than 2% points compared to a lack of these policies. Between 2005 
 
4 We do not present here the effects of the five separate policies. We have done this for the changes in production growth by 
sector in Table 4.2. The impact of the policies on production is representative for the impact on other variables.   31 
and 2025, the share in production still decreases but at a much slower pace than without 
supporting policies. 
Table 4.3  EU production as share of world production by sector for Cosy at Home, 2025 
 
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  14.3   11.6   11.9  
Energy carriers  19.2   16.5   17.8  
Food products  26.9   22.7   23.5  
Textiles and wearing apparel  19.3   13.9   16.2  
Wood and other manufacturing  25.6   21.8   23.8  
Pulp, paper and publishing  27.8   23.4   24.4  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  27.7   20.7   23.5  
Non-metallic minerals  28.6   21.5   22.7  
Basic metals  26.2   19.0   20.8  
Electronic equipment  22.1   12.9   19.0  
Transport equipment  29.3   23.5   27.6  
Other machinery and equipment  28.5   19.0   22.1  
Research and development  22.5   18.9   29.8  
Transport services  25.5   22.0   23.1  
Construction  24.8   19.3   20.9  
Trade services  23.4   20.0   21.5  
Communication  24.8   20.6   21.8  
Financial services  21.7   18.7   19.7  
Other business services  29.1   26.2   27.7  
Other services  28.1   23.8   25.8  
       
Source: WorldScan       
 
In 2005, the EU has the highest production shares in medium-high technology sectors and in 
other business services. In the high technology sector, electronic equipment, Europe’s market 
share is relatively low and in time this process is reinforced. 
 
Table 4.4 complements these conclusions by presenting the shift of Europe’s trade shares in 
global trade, represented by exports. Europe’s exports reflect external trade. In electronic 
equipment, Europe’s exports share is already low in 2005 and it decreases over time. This is 
also the case for textiles and wearing apparel. In wood and other manufacturing, Europe’s trade 
share increases, and for food products it remains constant. In other machinery and equipment, 
the decline in market shares is substantial and framework policies do not have much impact 
here. For transport equipment, the framework policies are helpful in maintaining market shares 
the next two decades. Europe’s market shares in most services sectors increase somewhat, 
although the framework policies do not contribute to that increase. The reason is that these 
policies are more supportive for manufacturing because of the R&D intensity and trade 
openness. As a result, these sectors draw resources away from services.   32 
Table 4.4  EU export flows as share of world export flows by sector for Cosy at Home 
       
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  4.9   5.9   5.1  
Energy carriers  10.3   22.4   19.5  
Food products  26.0   26.6   24.9  
Textiles and wearing apparel  12.4   9.5   9.7  
Wood and other manufacturing  20.6   23.5   23.8  
Pulp, paper and publishing  25.2   22.8   20.4  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  30.9   24.9   28.7  
Non-metallic minerals  30.6   28.6   26.6  
Basic metals  19.8   16.2   15.0  
Electronic equipment  12.5   7.4   10.7  
Transport equipment  27.5   22.2   27.5  
Other machinery and equipment  25.9   16.8   17.5  
Transport services  29.0   31.4   28.4  
Construction  43.2   50.1   46.3  
Trade services  31.1   38.0   31.8  
Communication  31.0   24.6   18.8  
Financial services  39.1   39.8   33.3  
Other business services  36.2   37.3   31.3  
Other services  30.5   31.6   24.6  
       
Source: WorldScan       
 
The share of electronic equipment and other machinery and equipment in total exports reduces 
over time. Overall the share of manufacturing in EU exports decreases from 65.6% to 54.1% in 
2025. For services its aggregate share in exports increase by about 8.7%. The framework 
policies limit these changes by about 50%. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the so-called revealed comparative advantages of the various sectors in the EU. 
It measures the exports of a particular sector in total exports relative to the average export share 
of that sector in other countries (and multiplied by 100).
5 Hence, if a sector features an index 
higher than 100, then it is said that a region specialises its exports in that sector (i.e. it has a 
comparative advantage in that sector relative to other regions). From Table 4.5, we learn that 
the EU-27 specialises today in the exports of food products, paper products, chemicals and non- 
metallic minerals, transport equipment, other machinery and equipment and services.
6 
According to Cosy at Home, the EU-27 maintains its comparative advantage in most of these 
sectors. Only in other machinery and equipment, the comparative advantage disappears, but it 
increases in wood and other manufacturing. In services, comparative advantages even increases 
for every sector. 
 
 
5 Also here, only extra EU exports are included in the analysis. 
6 Export of construction is small en not discussed further.   33 
Europe has no comparative advantage in textiles and wearing apparel, basic metals and 
electronic equipment. This will not change over time and its competitiveness is only slightly 
affected by the framework policies. 
Table 4.5  Revealed comparative advantage in the EU-27 for Cosy at Home 
       
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  21   29   25  
Energy carriers  44   110   96  
Food products  112   130   122  
Textiles and wearing apparel  53   46   48  
Wood and other manufacturing  89   115   117  
Pulp, paper and publishing  109   111   100  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  133   122   141  
Non-metallic minerals  132   140   130  
Basic metals  85   79   74  
Electronic equipment  54   36   53  
Transport equipment  119   108   135  
Other machinery and equipment  112   82   86  
Transport services  125   153   139  
Construction  186   245   227  
Trade services  134   186   156  
Communication  134   120   92  
Financial services  169   195   164  
Other business services  156   182   154  
Other services  132   154   121  
       
Source: WorldScan       
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5  Manufacturing in Adventuring in the World 
This section presents the future of European manufacturing in Adventuring the World. It has a 
similar structure as section 4. First, the overall developments of European manufacturing are 
discussed by presenting changes in value added and shares in global production and trade. The 
macroeconomic impact of the framework policies is also assessed. Section 5.2 concentrates on 
specific manufacturing sectors characterised by different of technology, R&D intensity, skill 
intensity, and trade openness. We focus on production growth, shares in global production and 
trade, and revealed comparative advantages by sector. For each sector, we also assess the 
impact of the framework policies. 
5.1  Manufacturing in a broad perspective 
The trend towards services is stronger in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at Home. The 
share of services in value added increase to 76.1% in 2025. This is 1.5% points higher than in 
Cosy at Home. The share of manufacturing is correspondingly lower, it is only 18.8% in 2025. 
This is a decline of 5% points between 2005 and 2025, but is also indicates that not all 
manufacturing will disappear from Europe in spite of the rise of Asia. 
The relative decline of manufacturing in Europe is also illustrated in Figure 5.1.  
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Europe’s share in global production decreases from 26.6% to 19.4% in 2025. Asia’s share 
increases from 21.2% to 37.7%. In Adventuring the World the production shifts are somewhat 
larger than in Cosy at Home. The share of the Rest of the OECD decreases by about 11%. The 
framework policies mitigate Europe’s decline in manufacturing. In 2025 Europe’s share is still 
22.9% which is 3.5% points higher than without framework policies. The impact of the 
framework policies is larger in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at Home. The increased 
competition in Adventuring the World worsens on average the position of European 
manufacturing, but its competitiveness becomes also more sensitive for good policies.   36 
Figure 5.2 presents the developments in the manufacturing trade shares of the EU, Rest OECD, 
Asia and the rest of the world between 2005 and 2025 in Adventuring the World. Also here, the 
patterns are presented with and without framework policies. Europe’s share in global 
manufacturing trade decreases from 22.7% to 17.3% in 2025, the same decrease as in Cosy at 
Home.
7  However, the global trade shares of China, India and South-East Asia increase from 
26.7 to 36.8%, 2% points higher than in Cosy at Home. This comes at the expense of the Rest 
OECD. Framework policies support the future of European manufacturing. The decrease in 
trade share of global manufacturing is mitigated to 19.0% in 2025. 








2005 2010 2015 2020 2025








2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
European Union Rest OECD South East Asia Rest of the World 
 
5.2  Manufacturing in a detailed perspective 
Economic growth in Europe and the world is higher in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at 
Home (see Table 2.3). This is also reflected in production growth by sector. If we compare 
Table 5.1 and Table 4.1 production grows faster in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at 
Home for nearly all sectors in Europe, except textiles and wearing apparel and electronic 
equipment (comparison based on no framework policies case). These are also sectors in which 
Europe has a comparative disadvantage. It seems that increasing globalisation and a faster 
technological change reinforces existing specialization patterns.  
For most sectors, production growth is about 1% per year higher in Adventuring the World. 
For wood and other manufacturing, transport equipment, construction and non-metallic 
minerals, it is about 2% higher per year and for chemicals, rubbers and plastics and transport 
services about 1.5%. 
As is concluded from Cosy at Home, framework policies have a substantial effect on 
production growth in manufacturing. The sector electronic equipment grows by 3% per year 
extra if these policies are implemented. For chemicals, rubber and plastics, transport equipment 
 
7 Note that intra-EU trade is excluded from these figures.   37 
the yearly growth increase is about 1.5% and for textiles and wearing apparel and other 
machinery and equipment about 1%. Production growth effects in services are much smaller. 
Table 5.1  EU production growth by sector for Adventuring in the World (annual growth in % for 2005-
 
Sector  No framework policies  Framework policies 
     
Agriculture, oil and minerals  2.7   2.8  
Energy carriers  3.4   3.6  
Food products  2.1   2.4  
Textiles and wearing apparel  0.1   1.1  
Wood and other manufacturing  3.8   4.4  
Pulp, paper and publishing  2.3   2.5  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  2.7   4.1  
Non-metallic minerals  3.1   3.4  
Basic metals  2.0   2.7  
Electronic equipment  - 1.1   2.0  
Transport equipment  3.1   4.6  
Other machinery and equipment  1.5   2.6  
Research and development  0.8   3.7  
Transport services  3.4   3.8  
Construction  2.8   3.1  
Trade services  2.0   2.2  
Communication  3.1   3.2  
Financial services  2.0   2.0  
Other business services  2.2   2.3  
Other services  2.0   2.2  
     
Source: WorldScan 
 
Table 5.2 presents the impact of each of the policies: increasing skills, increasing R&D, 
reducing the administrative burden, strengthening the internal market and improving energy 
efficiency on production. In most services sectors production hardly increases but in 
manufacturing some of the production changes are stunning. In electronic equipment production 
increases by 80%. In the sectors textiles and wearing apparel, wood and other manufacturing, 
chemicals, basic metals, transport equipment and other machinery and equipment production 
increases by more than 10% to about 30% in 2025. Key are the R&D and innovation policies 
and the strengthening of the internal market. For the R&D-intensive manufacturing sectors 
R&D policy and increased trade through the internal market contribute both for nearly 50% to 
the overall effect. For R&D-extensive sectors, like textiles, and wood and other manufacturing 
only the internal market policy is important. The skills policy, reduction of administrative 
burden and more energy efficiency contribute less to manufacturing production. Only energy 
efficiency has a substantial effect on the production of chemicals, rubber and plastics. The 
impact of the skills policy and the reduction of the administrative burden varies less by sector, 
but these policies have more impact on manufacturing than on services on average. These 
differences are more pronounced in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at Home.   38 














             
Agriculture, oil and minerals  0.3  0.5  1.0  - 1.9  0.5  0.5 
Energy carriers  0.3  2.2  1.1  3.7  - 3.9  3.6 
Food products  0.3  1.4  1.1  0.7  0.7  4.2 
Textiles and wearing apparel  0.9  -1.6  2.4  17.5  1.1  20.4 
Wood and other manufacturing  0.6  0.9  1.8  8.1  1.9  13.4 
Pulp, paper and publishing  0.6  1.4  1.6  - 0.4  0.8  4.1 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  0.7  13.8  2.0  10.8  4.4  31.7 
Non-metallic minerals  0.5  3.2  1.6  - 0.3  1.3  6.5 
Basic metals  0.9  5.1  2.4  9.0  - 2.1  15.3 
Electronic equipment  0.9  40.7  3.2  39.7  1.2  85.8 
Transport equipment  0.7  16.4  2.0  12.1  1.3  32.4 
Other machinery and equipment  1.0  8.0  2.5  13.1  - 0.5  24.0 
Research and development  1.4  64.0  2.2  5.4  0.6  73.7 
Transport services  0.5  0.8  1.3  0.3  4.4  7.3 
Construction  0.4  2.0  1.4  2.4  0.6  6.9 
Trade services  0.5  1.5  1.3  0.4  0.4  4.1 
Communication  0.5  0.8  1.5  - 0.7  0.2  2.4 
Financial services  0.6  0.4  1.4  - 1.7  0.2  0.8 
Other business services  0.4  1.3  1.4  - 0.3  0.3  3.1 




Table 5.1 shows that production increases in all sectors, except for electronic equipment 
without policy. This does however not imply that manufacturing in Europe keeps the growth 
path of manufacturing in other regions. High economic growth in Asia expands manufacturing 
production there. The Asian share at the world markets increases, both measured in production 
and trade, see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. On average, Europe’s share in production decreases by 
about 5.4% points. For electronic equipment, the decline is dramatic from 22% to less than 8% 
(see Table 5.3), but also in other machinery and equipment and textiles and wearing apparel the 
decline is substantial, about 10% of global production. In chemicals, rubber and plastics and 
basic metals, the loss in production share is also substantial, but in wood and other 
manufacturing we see a small increase in the share of global production. The pattern of changes 
in production shares differs in both scenarios. The average decrease is equal, but the changes 
per sector over time are more pronounced in the Adventuring the World. 
 
The framework policies contribute to European’s share of manufacturing production. In all 
sectors production share increases most notably for chemicals, rubber and plastics, electronic 
equipment and transport equipment. In transport equipment and wood and other manufacturing, 
Europe’s production shares even increase compared to 2005.   39 
Table 5.3  EU-27 production as share of world production by sector for Adventuring in the World 
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  14.3   11.8   12.0  
Energy carriers  19.2   18.4   19.8  
Food products  26.9   23.0   23.9  
Textiles and wearing apparel  19.3   9.7   11.5  
Wood and other manufacturing  25.6   25.9   28.7  
Pulp, paper and publishing  27.8   24.6   25.6  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  27.7   21.1   26.3  
Non-metallic minerals  28.6   24.9   26.2  
Basic metals  26.2   18.6   21.0  
Electronic equipment  22.1   7.7   13.7  
Transport equipment  29.3   24.8   31.0  
Other machinery and equipment  28.5   17.7   21.4  
Research and development  22.5   18.6   30.8  
Transport services  25.5   23.5   24.7  
Construction  24.8   21.0   22.5  
Trade services  23.4   20.6   22.0  
Communication  24.8   20.7   21.8  
Financial services  21.7   19.1   20.0  
Other business services  29.1   27.5   28.9  
Other services  28.1   24.2   26.0  
       
Source: WorldScan       
 
Table 5.4 shows the impact of globalisation and faster technological growth in Adventuring the 
World on the share of EU exports in global exports by sector. Already in 2005, Europe’s share 
in manufacturing is on average lower than in services, which is not surprising because nearly no 
countries export services outside the OECD countries. Only in chemicals, rubber and plastics 
and non-metallic minerals, Europe has a similar position as in services. In particular in 
electronic equipment and textiles and wearing apparel, Europe’s trade shares are low. Over 
time, the trade shares decrease in all manufacturing sectors, except wood and other 
manufacturing and non metallic minerals. It increases in nearly all services sectors except 
communication and other services. The decline in chemicals, rubber and plastics, and the 
combined machinery and equipment sectors is substantial. While in the past mainly unskilled 
labour-intensive sectors were affected by increasing international competition, more skilled and 
capital-intensive sectors are also affected the coming decades. 
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Table 5.4  EU export flows as share of world export flows by sector for Adventuring in the World 
 
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  4.9   8.2   7.4  
Energy carriers  10.3   26.0   24.3  
Food products  26.0   24.6   23.8  
Textiles and wearing apparel  12.4   9.5   9.1  
Wood and other manufacturing  20.6   26.9   27.7  
Pulp, paper and publishing  25.2   23.4   21.6  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  30.9   23.0   27.8  
Non-metallic minerals  30.6   32.1   30.9  
Basic metals  19.8   15.9   15.1  
Electronic equipment  12.5   6.5   9.1  
Transport equipment  27.5   22.2   27.7  
Other machinery and equipment  25.9   15.9   16.5  
Transport services  29.0   39.1   37.3  
Construction  43.2   52.1   48.6  
Trade services  31.1   39.9   34.5  
Communication  31.0   28.3   23.1  
Financial services  39.1   41.0   35.7  
Other business services  36.2   37.2   32.5  
Other services  30.5   29.7   23.7  
       
Source: WorldScan       
 
The changes in EU trade shares are more or les comparable in both scenarios. Differences are 
found inn the increases in wood and other manufacturing and non metallic minerals in 
Adventuring the World. The framework policies support some EU manufacturing export shares, 
but not in food products, textiles and wearing apparel, pulp, paper and publishing non metallic 
minerals and basic metals. These are R&D-extensive manufacturing sectors, but also 
framework policies do not offset the decline of the R&D intensive sectors over time in the EU. 
The positive effect of framework policies on the R&D intensive sectors in Europe comes at the 
relative expense of services. 
In the composition of the EU exports, the share of other manufacturing and equipment 
declines. The share of sectors like food products, wood and other manufacturing, pulp, paper 
and printing, basic metals, and non-metallic minerals increases somewhat. Overall, the changes 
in the export composition are less pronounced in Adventuring the World than in Cosy at Home. 
With framework policies, the changes are even smaller. The share of manufacturing products in 
EU exports decreases only by 2% points between 2005 and 2025. 
 
Despite these similarities, the developments in comparative advantages vary substantially 
among the scenarios. In general, the revealed comparative advantages change most in 
Adventuring the World, where markets become more integrated. Europe looses competitiveness 
in textiles and wearing apparel, basic metals, and electronic equipment. These are already   41 
sectors in which Europe did not specialize. It looses its comparative advantage in other 
machinery and equipment. The comparative advantages in wood and other manufacturing and 
non-metallic minerals and services increases with and without framework policies. For 
chemicals, rubber and plastics, framework policies are necessary to keep the competitive 
advantage of 2005. 
Table 5.5  Revealed comparative advantage in the EU-27 for Adventuring in the World 
 
  2005  2025  2025 
       
Sector    No framework policies  Framework policies 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  21   40   36  
Energy carriers  44   128   118  
Food products  112   121   115  
Textiles and wearing apparel  53   47   44  
Wood and other manufacturing  89   133   134  
Pulp, paper and publishing  109   115   105  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  133   113   134  
Non-metallic minerals  132   158   149  
Basic metals  85   78   73  
Electronic equipment  54   32   44  
Transport equipment  119   110   134  
Other machinery and equipment  112   79   80  
Transport services  125   192   181  
Construction  186   257   235  
Trade services  134   196   167  
Communication  134   139   112  
Financial services  169   202   173  
Other business services  156   183   157  
Other services  132   146   115  
       
Source: WorldScan       
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6  Conclusions 
Is there a future for manufacturing in Europe and can framework policies help to improve this 
future? The answer to these questions can be analysed from different perspectives. The glory 
time for manufacturing as steering engine for Europe’s economy and provider of employment 
for the majority of its labour force is over. This is already the case for a long time. The share of 
manufacturing in employment as well as in value added decreases in the OECD countries, 
including Europe, already for decades on end, although its share in trade remains still high and 
its productivity still increases. This scenario study shows that the trend of a declining 
manufacturing sector is likely to continue over the next decades and that Asia will become the 
world’s most important provider of manufacturing goods. Framework policies can help to 
mitigate this decline, but not reverse it. This does not mean that there is no future for 
manufacturing in Europe. In 2025, Europe’s share in the overall global manufacturing 
production and trade will still be about 20%, and manufacturing will still contribute more than 
15% to value added in Europe. A further strengthening of the internal market and adequate 
R&D and innovation policies can have a substantial impact on these shares. 
 
The literature indicates that globalisation, technological progress, business models, ageing and 
the availability of energy and sustainability of the environment are among the main drivers for 
the future of manufacturing in Europe. The future trends of these drivers are uncertain. In order 
to assess Europe’s future in manufacturing we have developed two scenarios with varying 
trends in globalisation, technological progress, business models and energy efficiency. From 
these scenarios, we conclude that the trend towards a services economy is likely to continue and  
manufacturing contributes less to the European economy in terms of employment and value 
added. However, manufacturing production still grows and is important for trade in Europe. In 
the Adventuring the World scenario in which globalisation and technological progress thrive, 
production grows quickly, but the geographical centre of global manufacturing production shifts 
to Asia. In the Cosy at Home scenario with less globalisation and technological progress, 
production grows more slowly and the European share in global production is relatively larger. 
 
Within manufacturing, various developments take place. Based on historical productivity 
growth paths of manufacturing sectors, their trade openness, R&D intensity, energy efficiency, 
and skill intensity, it is highly likely that these (sub)sectors will develop differently over time. It 
has to be noted also that the developments may also differ within the ten manufacturing sectors 
identified. In most of these aggregate sectors, one can distinguish basic and specialized 
manufacturing. Basic manufacturing will on average be more affected by international 
competitiveness than specialized manufacturing. Possible intra-sector shifts from basic to 
specialized manufacturing are not analysed here, but are certainly relevant. In this study, an 
applied general equilibrium framework was used to represent Europe’s relations with other   44 
regions and to assess the relations between manufacturing and services sectors. This is a very 
valuable framework because linkages and spillovers between sectors and countries are very 
important for the functioning of economies. However, this choice excludes a further, more 
detailed look at manufacturing sectors at a more disaggregated level. 
 
A number of interesting conclusions on the future of manufacturing in Europe can be drawn. 
The increase in trade and, more generally, globalisation appears to be one of the most important 
drivers. The sectors which are already most open for international trade are also the ones mostly 
affected by this trend. These include textiles and wearing apparel, wood and other 
manufacturing, chemicals, rubber and plastics, electronic equipment, transport equipment and 
other machinery and equipment. Overall, the sectors food products and pulp, paper and 
publishing are less affected. These are sectors which are more domestically oriented, less R&D 
intensive and face less technological progress. Europe has no comparative advantages in textiles 
and wearing apparel, electronic equipment and basic metals. These disadvantages will further 
manifest themselves in the oncoming twenty years. This in particular applies to electronic 
equipment which – while in the past a relative big sector - will decline even further. Textiles 
and wearing apparel is an already small sector in terms of value added and employment, which 
means that an even less prosperous future for this sector will also have less overall impact. 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics, transport equipment and other transport and equipment will 
remain important manufacturing sectors in Europe, although the comparative advantages in the 
other machinery and equipment sector will slide away. 
 
Of the framework policies analysed in this study, improving skills, reducing the administrative 
burden and increasing energy efficiency, have the least impact on manufacturing. R&D and 
innovation policies and strengthening the internal market on the other hand have the strongest 
and most positive impact on manufacturing. These are also the most ambitious in terms of 
policy formulation and implementation, but potentially very effective in supporting 
manufacturing because of their R&D intensive and open-to-trade nature. These policies do not 
alter the trend that Europe’s share in global production and trade will continue to decline, but 
they do mitigate the overall decline, in particular in the chemicals, rubber and plastics, and 
combined machinery and equipment sectors. 
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Common characteristics in the scenarios 
Several exogenous variables are similar in all scenarios. We have two reasons to do so. The first 
is that some trends are common in all scenarios, such as trade liberalisation between the EU-15 
and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). The second is that the model is 
calibrated on one database, which is scenario independent. Many elasticities and exogenous 
variables, such as trade barriers, are determined in the calibration procedure and are therefore 
identical in all scenarios. 
 
Our calibration year is 2001. The model is calibrated on the basis of the GTAP database, 
version 6 (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005). Using data of the World Bank (2007), we run the 
model from 2001 to 2005 to reproduce GDP per capita and unemployment rates until 2005. 
Table A.1  Common trends in the scenarios 
Variable  Source 
   
Population growth  Projections from Eurostat and IPCC 
Participation rates  Projections based on ILO, Eurostat and UN 
Relative sectoral TFP growth   Based on historical trends ISDB data (OECD) 
Sectoral consumption  Based on GTAP data 
Substitution elasticities for international trade  Based on Hertel et al. (2004), and for services own guess 
EU enlargement   Elimination all remaining tariffs EU-15- EU-12 
   
Source: Lejour et al. (2006) 
 
Population growth and labour-market participation 
The population projection are based on assumptions on fertility, migration and life. Table A.2 
shows that population growth in the EU-27 declines in time from 0.2 % per year to zero. For the 
new EU-27 members (mainly the Central and Eastern European countries) the population will 
even diminish. 
Table A.2  Population growth (annual averages 2006-2040) and participation rates (as ratio of population) 
Region           Population growth                    Participation rate 
  2006-2025  2025-2040  2005  2025  2040 
           
EU-27  0.2  0  47.0  43.6  40.6 
   EU-15  0.3  0.1  47.3  43.3  40.8 
   EU-12   - 0.3  - 0.5  46.0  44.4  39.3 
Rest OECD  0.6  0.4  50.8  47.5  43.6 
South East Asia  1.1  0.5  48.4  50.6  50.9 
Rest of the World  1.0  0.6  42.7  45.8  46.8 
           
Source: Eurostat (2002)  for EU-27, and United Nations (2002) for other regions. 
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Outside the EU-27, the population growth is much higher. In the period 2006-2025 the 
population of the Rest of the OECD, i.e. the United States and Japan, increases with 0.6% per 
year and the population of the non-OECD even with more than 1% per year. In the second 
period (2025-2040) of the scenarios, population grows less rapid, but still round 0.5% per year. 
Table A.2 shows that participation rates in the EU-27 are declining. The drop in 
participation (as a share of total population) in the EU-27 is foremost a result of population 
developments, i.e. aging. In 2005 still 47.0% of the total population participates on the labour-
market, while in 2040 this ratio is only 40.6%. The same trend can also be seen in the Rest of 
the OECD. Outside the OECD the opposite trend emerges: participation rates are increasing 
from 48.4% in 2005 to 50.9% in 2040 for South East Asia and from 42.7% to 46.8% for the 
Rest of the World. 
 
Table A.3  Sectoral value added and its components in percentages for the EU-27 in 2001  
Sector 
Share  











             
Agriculture, oil and minerals  2.7   1.8  48   6   26   1  
Energy carriers 
a
  2.2   1.0  17   16   62   2  
Food products  3.4  1.1  31   15   53   1  
Textiles and wearing apparel  1.1   1.6  51   18   31   1  
Wood and other manufacturing  0.9   1.3  45   18   36   1  
Pulp, paper and publishing  1.7   1.1  37   28   34   1  
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  3.3   2.3  35   19   30   15  
Non-metallic minerals  1.2   1.5  38   19   41   2  
Basic metals  2.6   1.7  45   24   29   2  
Electronic equipment  1.9   1.7  39   16   21   24  
Transport equipment  2.5   1.7  46   14   15   25  
Other machinery and equipment  4.7  1.6  37   33   23   7  
Research and development  1.3   1.7  13   77   11   0  
Transport services  4.2   1.3  43   25   32   0  
Construction 
b
  4.7   0.6  60   2   37   0  
Trade services  13.0  0.8  42   22   36   0  
Communication  2.5   2.5  21   40   39   0  
Financial services 
b
  4.1   0.8  23   46   31   0  
Other business services 
b
  11.9   0.8  16   32   51   0  
Other services  30.3   0.6  28   42   30   0  
             
Source: Lejour et al. (2006). Note that numbers larger (smaller) than 1 imply that sectoral TFP grows faster (slower) than average 
(macro) TFP 
a Relative TFP growth is imposed due to missing data 
b Relative TFP growth is set equal to that in other services, because underlying data delivered (implausible) negative growth. 
 
Sectoral value added 
Sectoral value added is created by the input of labour, physical capital, and R&D capital and the 
production technology. The second column of table a.3 shows the share of manufacturing in 
macro value added for the EU-27: 23 %. This number is small compared with the 72 % of the   49 
services sectors. The largest manufacturing sectors are the combined machinery an equipment 
sector (9 %) and the chemicals, rubber and plastics sector (3 %).  
Table A.3 gives also numbers for the EU-27 on the input shares of value added. Only modest 
variation exists across the manufacturing sectors for low-skilled labour (31 % - 51 %), high 
skilled labour (14 % -33 %) and physical capital (15 % - 41 %). In contrast, the R&D 
endowments are highly concentrated in the sectors electronic and transport equipment, and in 
the sector chemicals, rubber and plastics. 
 
In the scenarios, the quantities of the inputs of value added will change and so will value added. 
Not only changes in the input quantities, but also changes in the efficiency of the production 
technology will determine the change in value added. TFP growth depends on the scenario 
characteristics, but we introduce common trends for the relative sectoral TFP growth. These 
numbers show that TFP growth is relatively high in telecommunications, agriculture, and most 
manufacturing sectors. It is very low or negligible in most service sectors, except transport and 
communications. 
Energy use by firms 
As can be seen in table a.4, the energy intensive sectors are: energy carriers itself (23.2%), 
agriculture (5.1%), paper, pulp and publishing (4.1%), chemicals, rubber and plastics (10.5%), 
non-metallic mineral products (8%), basic metals (6.0%) and, as is to be expected, transport 
services (21.6 %). The output of these sectors is likely to expand as a result of the improvement 
in energy efficiency. The other manufacturing sectors are hardly more energy-intensive than the 
services sectors (except transport), most notably the machinery and equipment sectors. 
 
Table A.4  Value share of energy costs as % of total production costs in 2001 for the EU-27 
       
Agriculture, oil and minerals  5.1    Transport equipment  0.9 
Energy carriers  23.2    Other Machinery and equipment  0.8 
Food products  1.9    Research and development  1.2 
Textiles and wearing apparel  2.2    Transport services  21.6 
Wood and other manufacturing  1.6    Construction  0.4 
Pulp, paper and publishing  4.1    Trade services  1.7 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics  10.5    Communication  0.9 
Non-metallic minerals  8.0    Financial services  0.6 
Basic metals  6.0    Other business services  0.9 
Electronic equipment   0.6    Other services  1.1 
       
Source: Dimaranan et al. (2005). 
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Trade and trade barriers 
The sectoral trade pattern for the EU-27 members in the year 2001 can be read from table a.5. 
Of all the exports from the EU-27, 77 % originates from the manufacturing sectors and 71 % of 
the imports consists of manufacturing, in particular the sectors chemicals, rubber and plastics, 
and the combined machinery and equipment sectors. Compared with the agriculture and 
services sectors, the manufacturing sectors export large parts of their production output. 
Similarly, also large parts of the domestic demand for manufacturing products comes from 
imports. Particularly high exports shares (percentage output) and imports shares (percentage 
absorption) are found for the sectors textiles and wearing apparel, chemicals, rubbers and 
plastics, and the combined machinery and equipment sectors. Changes in this trade pattern will 
emerge as a result of differences in trade prices between regions. The elasticity of substitution 
determines the sensitivity of the trade patterns for price differences. In table a.5 can be seen, 
that relatively high values for the manufacturing sectors are specified, which implies more 
intensive price competition on international trade markets for these sectors than for services 
sectors. 




Export share in 
output 
Export share in 
total exports 
Import share in 
absorption 
Import share in 
total imports 
           
Agriculture, oil and minerals  5.4  15  2.3  30  5.8 
Energy carriers  6.9  10  1.7  17  3.0 
Food products  5.0  16  5.0  15  4.7 
Textiles and wearing apparel  7.5  39  3.8  43  4.8 
Wood and other manufacturing  7.1  36  3.0  35  2.9 
Pulp, paper and publishing  5.9  20  2.7  19  2.4 
Chemicals. rubber and plastics  6.6  42  12.9  38  10.8 
Non-metallic minerals  5.8  22  2.0  19  1.7 
Basic metals  7.1  26  6.4  26  6.4 
Electronic equipment  8.8  48  7.4  53  8.8 
Transport equipment  6.3  52  13.1  48  11.1 
Other machinery and equipment  8.0  50  18.5  46  15.9 
Transport services  3.8  17  6.7  18  6.7 
Construction  3.8  2  0.6  2  0.6 
Trade services  3.8  4  2.4  4  2.7 
Communication  3.8  7  0.7  8  0.7 
Financial services  3.8  7  1.7  6  1.6 
Other business services  3.8  12  6.4  11  6.5 
Other services  3.8  2  2.7  2  2.9 
           
Source: WorldScan 
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Import and export prices are determined by the prices of production, although import and export 
taxes (both of the tariff and non tariff type) and transport costs also influence import and export 
prices. Changes in these taxes and in transport costs will be specific for the scenarios. 
 
The elimination of import and export tariffs resulting from the EU enlargement have been 
incorporated in both scenarios. However, import and export tariffs outside the EU-27 remain, 
especially for the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. We will introduce various forms of 
trade liberalisation on a regional and global scale in the scenarios.  
We have incorporated non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the model. These NTBs are important 
not only in services, but also in manufacturing and agriculture. Quantification of the NTBs is 
done in a straightforward manner: we assume for 2001 a non tariff barrier of 20 % (as ratio of 
import value) for all sectors and regions, which can be reduced in time with the size depending 
on the specific scenario, region and sector.    52 
 